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Investment as a Country-level Determinant of Public Opinion towards China
Abstract:

According to the New York Times, in 2009-2010 alone, China invested over $8.7 Billion US in “external publicity” primarily funneling through the “Big Four” media outlets, Xinhua, China Daily, CCTV, and China Radio International\(^1\). With Billions of Dollars going into this project, are the Chinese getting anything out of it? In this paper I seek to understand the country-level factors that determine perceptions of China, mainly favorability, which the Chinese are attempting to mold through outreach efforts. Specifically, this paper seeks to test the hypothesis that outward foreign investment from China is a determinant in national level favorability towards China. Using Pew public opinion data from 60 countries I challenge the results of Page and Xie that the available data does not reject the null hypothesis, then use my own survey data from Vietnam to explain the persuasive power of investment on an individual level and make recommendations to increase the positive public opinion response from increased Chinese investment.

Acknowledgements

I owe a lot of thanks to a lot of people. First off, my thesis advisor, Dr. Benjamin Radcliff, was an integral part of the formation of this thesis. His guidance reined in my ideas and pushed me to keep reading. I would like to thank Dr. Alexandra Guisinger for her encouragement, planning, and guidance in preparing for my field work in Vietnam. I’m incredibly grateful to Dr. David Nickerson for his valuable help in formulating and analyzing my field experiment, as well as his help completing the IRB and his enthusiastic accessibility. As always, thanks to Professor Kaplan for his guidance in the thesis process. I could not have completed my survey experiments in Vietnam without the help of my survey assistants, Hoang Le Hung and Minh Do, and their families, and more importantly, I’m grateful for their support, encouragement and great company. I am indebted to Linh Chi Phan, Hau Nguyen, and Tran Nguyen Phuong Ngan for their connections, their kindness, and their friendship. I would have been lost- literally and figuratively- without them. Finally, this research was funded in part by the Kellogg Institute for International Studies Summer Research Grant and the Political Science Department Strake Grant.
Introduction

The opening ceremonies of the Beijing Olympics in 2008, watched by about 1 billion, proudly showcased China’s 5,000 years of history culminating in the modern, hopefully, vibrant nation hosting the world’s most expensive Olympics to-date. To the tune of “Beijing Welcomes You,” the world was reminded, if it hadn’t heard already, that China was a powerful nation. China’s bid for the 2008 Summer Olympics is just one of many calculated efforts to polish its national image. Another potentially more subtle form of outreach is China’s burgeoning foreign investment funds. Chinese companies and investors are looking globally for opportunities to build factories, mines, roads, outlet malls and more. From Overseas Propaganda Departments to a growing role in South-South development, China has good reason to believe they benefit from positive global opinion, yet little research has been done to measure the outcome from these program. Specifically in this paper I seek to understand the role China’s outward foreign direct investment plays in shaping public opinion towards China. I accomplish this in two distinct parts. First, using macro-level data collected from 51 countries, I analyze the relationship between China’s reported stock FDI in a country and that country’s opinion towards China. Second, I use individual-level results from a field experiment in Vietnam to demonstrate that, while respondents have a limited knowledge of country-of-origin for brands investing in Vietnam, subjects will respond positively to information on the benefits of China’s investment.

The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows: Section I (macro-level data on China’s national image) contains five parts. First, I discuss relevant background literature on soft power, China as a case study, and foreign direct investment. Second, I review current literature on the topic of national image determinants. Third, I pose four hypothesis relating to country-level conditions that influence public opinion towards China. Fourth, I outline methodology. Finally, I
discuss the results of my analysis. Section II (field experiment in Vietnam) is laid out similarly to Section I in five parts. First, I discuss background and location choice for the field experiment. Second, I pose one central hypothesis that subjects will respond positively to a treatment increasing knowledge on Chinese investment and negatively to a treatment alerting subjects to the territorial disputes between Vietnam and China. Third, I outline methodology. Fourth, I discuss results of the experiment. Finally, I discuss potential issues with the methodology used. I end the paper with concluding remarks.

Section I: Macro-level Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment and Public Opinion towards China

Part 1: Background

Introduction to Soft Power

In his 1990 article for Foreign Policy, Joseph Nye introduced the concept of Soft Power as an alternative to Cold War arm-race politics. In this new post-Cold War world, Nye writes, “Proof of power lies not in resources but in the ability to change the behavior of states.” He argues that the changing nature of issues in world politics means that military power alone is no longer enough. Dealing with collective action problems, non-state actors, and nationalistic weak states, all in the context of transnational interdependence, requires a new form of “Soft” power. In fact, he predicts that economic, cultural, and ideological superiority may be the most easily deployed weapon in this new era of US military superiority.² Policy makers from Europe to the Americas to Asia have responded to this idea with new zeal for public diplomacy programs.

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aimed at controlling their country’s public image, however little research has been done to evaluate these public relations efforts.

**China as a case study**

According to the New York Times, in 2009-2010 alone, China invested over $8.7 Billion USD in “external publicity” primarily funneling through the “Big Four” media outlets, Xinhua, China Daily, CCTV, and China Radio International. In addition to funding “big four” media, China’s government has two separate offices tasked with managing China’s foreign image. The first is China’s “Overseas Publicity Department” within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The second is The Office of Information under the State Council. The term in Chinese for what these organizations do is “宣传” which is often translated into English as propaganda, but lacks the same negative connotation and can be used for product publicity as well. Many of the activities of these well-funded organizations are the purview of government agencies around the world supervising national images.

China presents an interesting case to study national image because of the high-level domestic interest in the topic. Both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, China’s last two presidents, have publicly vowed to increase China’s “cultural soft power”. In 2007 at the 17th National Congress Session, President Hu claimed “Culture has become a more and more important source of national cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength.” At a 2014 speech to members of the CPC Politburo, Xi, China’s current president, mentioned "The stories of China should be well told, voices of China well spread, and characteristics of China well explained," so as to increase China’s standing in the

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minds of a global audience\textsuperscript{5}. These are just a few examples of the existence of soft power in China. A simple search of China “Soft Power” on \textit{China Daily}, an official media outlet, returned 1996 results\textsuperscript{6}. With 5,000 years of history, 56 ethnic groups, and a booming economy, the Chinese have good reason to think that increased awareness about China will result in a positive international public image.

One of the most publicized outputs from China’s overseas publicity campaign is China’s Confucius Institutes. The first location opened in Seoul, South Korea in November of 2004\textsuperscript{7}, and since then the program has grown to over 440 institutes and 649 Confucius classrooms in 119 different countries\textsuperscript{8}. These institutes provide schools with young Chinese language and culture volunteer teachers in places that may not otherwise have an opportunity to learn about China, particularly in the way the Communist Party wants to be learnt about. The Chinese government, investing 200 Million USD in the institutes annually\textsuperscript{9}, sees this as money well-spent promoting bite-sized versions of Chinese culture to learners from k12 to college and beyond.

During the Cold War period, The Chinese Communist Party actively initiated trade agreements with lesser developed countries in Africa in return for recognition as the sole representative government of China and to gain entry into the United Nations. Since the Opening Up and Reform period, China has only expanded these bilateral ties, even to places isolated by Western governments like Iran and North Korea.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{6} <http://search.chinadaily.com.cn/searchen.jsp?searchText=China+%22Soft+Power%22&ch=2@usa&strAuthor=&strFromdate=&strTodate=&searchword=China+Soft+Power>
\end{thebibliography}
What many journalists call the “Beijing Consensus,” may also contribute to positive views towards China. Having pulled over 23 million people out of poverty between 2011 and 2012 alone\(^\text{10}\) and retaining national sovereignty in the process has gained China respect in the developing world as a viable model for development. This development even has an accompanying slogan, “中国梦” or the Chinese Dream, meant to draw contrast with the American Dream. The Beijing Consensus on development differs from Washington’s in its emphasis on state sovereignty and varied levels of state control over the economy. China’s development model has been promoted at various South-South conferences and high-level meetings. The 2008 Beijing Olympics were meant as a sort of coming of age party for the ancient country, demonstrating to the world that it had joined the ranks of developed, modern superpowers while still preserving its cultural uniqueness and state sovereignty.

Foreign aid is another method used to increase a country’s soft power. China’s leaders see foreign aid as an important component of securing rights to natural resources, becoming an alternative to the United States, and gaining respect among developed countries. As part of the South-South development trend, China trumpets its aid as a mutual relationship where both countries benefit. The division between aid and foreign direct investment however can sometimes be blurry. The China Africa Development Fund, established in 2007 as part of the China Development Bank, aims to increase development through investment in Chinese enterprises wishing to expand into Africa, or African enterprises partnering with Chinese enterprises. The fund focuses on agriculture and manufacturing industries, infrastructure, natural resource mining, and Chinese-organized industrial parks\(^\text{11}\). Much of China’s foreign aid is done


through investment in a “free market” manner, creating issues in total aid reporting. The strong theme in China’s aid diplomacy of upholding state sovereignty and developing in a mutually beneficial manner has gained it much praise in the developing world.

From the Olympics to overseas publicity, China has actively worked to improve its world image. Because of high-level interest, a long history of image management, and attention to the developing world, China presents an ideal case for a natural experiment on country-level determinants of public opinion.

*Foreign Investment as an Instrument of Soft Power*

Over the last century of U.S. economic hegemony, experts like Joseph Nye, have viewed American foreign direct investment largely – albeit with some contestation – as a foundation for expanding soft power. Nye writes, “Although they lack military power, transnational corporations have enormous economic resources… Multinational corporations are sometimes more relevant to achieving a country’s goals than are other states.” From McDonalds to Walmart, Ford to GE, U.S. run multinationals have spread American culture and American influence. In the last decade, China and Hong Kong have begun to rival the U.S. in foreign direct investment (FDI), causing a new dynamic in the international system. This new wave of FDI, driven by government policy, may similarly change perceptions of China, especially in Asia, where regional security tensions are high.

While still small compared to the United States, Hong Kong and China rank 4th and 5th in world FDI. China's top policy makers understand how investment in foreign countries can lead to more than just increase in efficiency and market access, as demonstrated by Hu Jintao and

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other top Chinese leaders repeated mentioning of the importance of Soft Power in speeches. Deliberate policies to increase investment in politically significant areas even within China itself mean Beijing is cognizant of the effects of MNCs on soft power.

Within its own borders, the Chinese Communist Party sees economic investment as a method for gaining legitimacy and quelling unrest against the central government. In Xinjiang, the Uighur-populated western province North of Tibet, the central government has been attempting to subdue the active separatist groups through investment by Han (China’s majority ethnic group) firms since the early days of the PRC\textsuperscript{13}. This framework for thinking about investment as a way to gain other sources of security and state legitimacy can easily be translated from domestic to foreign policy, and may contribute to some of China’s recent decisions to invest in bordering Afghanistan\textsuperscript{14}.

However, not all investment is good investment. In the past few years, Chinese companies have seen a backlash against their investments in parts of Africa because of the exploitative nature of the industries as well as the alleged mistreatment of their workers. Zambia, a historic trading partner with China has recently revoked the license of a large mining company outside of Lusaka\textsuperscript{15}. In the United States, concerns about national security and health have prompted reactions from consumers and politicians alike. Smithfield, America’s largest pork producer, was bought by the company Shuanghui, raising health and safety concerns. Despite keeping the largest pork processing plant in the world open in Tar Heel, North Carolina, China’s


recent investment has arguably decreased favorable opinions towards China in the country\textsuperscript{16}. The Congressional inquiry into Huawei technologies eventually prevented the company from opening a high-tech plant in Colorado because of cybersecurity concerns\textsuperscript{17}. These instances demonstrate that not all foreign direct investment contribute to a positive image of China.

\textit{Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth}

   If we think of people in the sense of the “economic man,” constantly calculating how to maximize their personal interests, usually wealth, foreign direct investment into their country should maximize their self-interest. Multinational corporations can bring with them capital, jobs, spill-off industries, competitive pricing, and increased consumer choice.

   Jakobsen and Jakobsen (2011) however, challenge the notion that investment is applauded by citizens universally while examining location choice in foreign direct investment. The two hypothesized first that economic nationalism might cause strong anti-FDI public opinion. Secondly they hypothesize that leftist countries are more likely to prefer OFDI because it benefits labor, whereas rightist countries would oppose OFDI because it would decrease the economic power of the capital-owning classes. Using foreign direct investment as a dependent variable, they created a model with World Values Survey data on confidence in large enterprises as a proxy for economic nationalism and a value for liberalization as independent variables.

   Jakobsen and Jakobsen found significant results indicating that high levels of economic


nationalism and liberalization was related to lower levels of foreign direct investment within the country\textsuperscript{18}.

In an article for \textit{Applied Economics}, Batten and Vo analyzed the relationship between foreign direct investment and economic growth. They improved upon existing literature indicating that FDI promotes growth by examining a range of conditions under which FDI may more strongly increase economic growth. The two found in particular that high levels of education and high levels of openness to international trade and lower rates of population growth benefited more from foreign direct investment than countries without these characteristics\textsuperscript{19}.

Import Substituting and Export Promoting trade regimes add another layer to the effects of foreign direct investment on economic growth. Balasubramanhyam, Salisu, and Sapsford tested the effects of trade regime on FDI and Growth across a range of countries in their analysis. Because of limited data, the research team classified import substituting and export promoting countries based on their imports to GDP ratio. They then ranked the ratios in ascending order and performed a CUSUM-SQ test to identify a structural break in their sample, placing countries into a low-import ratio group. Countries with a low import to GDP ratio were considered import substituting. Using this classification system, the researchers found that “while FDI is a potent driving force in the growth process in (Export Promoting) countries… it exerts no (significant) influence upon growth in (Import Substituting) countries\textsuperscript{20}.”

\textbf{Part 2: Current Literature on National Image Determinants}

Surprisingly, the literature on country-level determinants of any national image is extremely scarce. Page and Xie approached this problem in regards to China from both the individual and country levels. On the individual level, Page and Xie analyzed a large number of survey results mostly from The United States around 2007-2008. The two found the American public was largely “lukewarm” towards China throughout that time period and most, around 60%, considered China to be friendly, but not an ally\(^\text{21}\).

Page and Xie also analyzed macro-level determinants of China’s national image. Because of the scant literature on the topic, Page and Xie picked out variables they thought might influence positive or negative perceptions of China. Strong bilateral ties, similar political systems, low levels of economic and social development, high levels of investment, and high numbers of Confucius Institutes, Page and Xie hypothesize, should correlate with high favorability towards China. Page and Xie chose to measure bilateral ties by the number of visits by top leaders in the year 2006. For similar political systems, they used freedom house scores, and for development, they used UN Human Development Index scores. To measure the levels of investment, they used a report by the People’s Republic of China Ministry of Commerce reporting investment totals in countries from 2003 through 2006. For numbers of Confucius Institutes, they calculated the total number of Confucius Institutes in each country.

The results pointed to Human Development as a strong determinant in country-level public opinion towards China. Human Development, measured as a weighted combination of three components (education, health, and income) equal a score between 0 and 1, 0 being least developed and 1 being most developed. The results from Page and Xie indicate that publics from

less developed countries have a more favorable image than those from more developed countries. A one-unit movement in Human Development would increase public opinion on China by 56 points, however since the scale is from 0 to 1, a .1 unit movement would still increase public opinion by close to 6 percentage points.

The researchers were surprised to find none of the other indicators they measured, including investment, had any statistical significance in their model. Confucius Institutes had the expected positive sign, however they were not found to have any statistical significance. One explanation for this, according to Page and Xie, is that the institutes are too new to show an effect. Bilateral relations also had no effect, even when the researchers replaced this variable with total civilian and military official visits or with a country’s trade with China as a percentage of its total international trade. None of these variables had statistically significant results.

This work contributes to the existing literature by considering the country conditions under which foreign direct investment is shown to generate growth. In addition, I use updated data and measurements of stock FDI instead of flow FDI. Because very few researchers have added to the literature on this topic, even a replication of the experiment can still largely contribute to the reliability of Page and Xie’s experiment. In my own model, I build on Page and Xie’s work to reexamine the effects of Chinese outward foreign direct investment on favorability towards China considering other country conditions including: education levels, import substituting or export promoting trade regimes, and political orientation.

**Part 3: Hypotheses Concerning Investment Determinants of China’s National Image**

Because investment has an established relationship to economic growth, people should associate high levels of investment with increased favorability towards the investing country.
While Page and Xie did not find this effect in their data, an updated analysis using a larger sample and additional data may show significant results. This leads to my first hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1:** China’s Investment should be positively related to favorable public perceptions of China in that country.

Certain conditions should increase or decrease the strength of investment on public opinion based on the available literature demonstrating the conditions relationship with economic growth. Export promoting trade regimes have a stronger relationship to investment-led growth than import substituting, so countries using export promoting trade regimes should experience a stronger positive relationship between Chinese investment and public opinion. Conversely, import substituting trade regimes should experience less growth from Chinese investment, so import substituting trade regimes should experience a weaker positive relationship between Chinese investment and public opinion.

**Hypothesis 2:** China’s investment should be positively related to favorable public perceptions of China in that country when that country does not use an import substitution trade regime.

Higher levels of education have been found to have a strong positive relationship with the growth effects of investment. Educational attainment should have a positive effect both directly on public opinion towards China and indirectly on the growth effects of foreign direct investment.

**Hypothesis 3:** China’s investment should be positively related to favorable public perceptions of China in countries with high levels of educational attainment.
Liberal economic systems lead to higher economic growth from foreign investment. Citizens within these systems tend to have a better understanding of the benefits from foreign trade and investment, so liberal economic systems should result in more positive views towards China and Chinese investment.

**Hypothesis 4:** China’s investment should be positively related to favorable public perceptions of China in countries with liberal economic systems.

**Part 4: Methodology**

The dependent variable in this analysis, China’s favorability ratings, was taken from Pew Global Attitudes Survey data in the years 2002 and 2005 through 2013\(^2\). Pew asked respondents whether they had a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion towards China and compiled that data into percentages of respondents choosing each option in each country. To create a percentage of combined total favorability, I added the percentages of very favorable and somewhat favorable. Rather than select only one survey year, I combined each year with data available by taking the mean response. This left 59 countries with favorability data available.

The primary independent variable in this analysis is foreign direct investment. This data can be found using China’s Ministry of Commerce 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment\(^2\). The Ministry of Commerce published a list of total Chinese OFDI flows and stock OFDI in 183 counties from 2004 to 2010. The 2006 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment includes data from 2003 to 2006, so combined the

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data used in this study is total Chinese stock OFDI in each year between 2003 and 2010 measured in millions of USD.

Identifying large numbers of countries as import substituting or export promoting was a challenge. I first used data from the World Bank measuring a country’s yearly imports of goods and services as a percentage of their GDP. Countries with low import to GDP ratios should be less open to imports and foreign economic investment in general. To create a binary variable for import substituting or not import substituting trade regimes, I used the method employed by Balasubramananyam, Salisu, and Sapsford. I ranked each country’s mean import level, then inverted the imports value and used a cusum-sq test to identify structural breaks in the data. Using this method, I determined that the lowest 25 ranked imports to GDP values could be considered import substituting trade regimes.

A secondary independent variable is educational attainment taken from the World Bank Development Indicators. Specifically, I used the percentage of the eligible population proceeding to secondary school. This is the same indicator used by Batten and Vo in their article determining country-level conditions contributing to growth from Foreign Direct Investment.

To quantify a country’s economic liberalism, I used the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom total score for 2014. A score close to zero means low economic liberalism and a score close to 100 means high levels of economic liberalism. The Heritage Foundation

separates “Economic Freedom” into four parts: Rule of Law, Limited Government, Regulatory Efficiency, and Open Markets. These parts are divided further into sub-groups. Rule of Law consists of scores on corruption and property rights. Limited Government consists of fiscal freedom and government spending scores. Regulatory Efficiency consists of business freedom, labor freedom, and monetary freedom. The open markets measurement consists of trade freedom, investment freedom and financial freedom. While the Heritage Foundation’s index encompasses other indicators outside of trade and investment, I decided to use the overall measurement of economic freedom to identify structurally strong economic liberalism.

Because of the limited change in Human Development Indicators over that time period, HDI from 2006 was used in the dataset. HDI is included because of the high significance demonstrated in the literature. Human Development is measured in the index as a composite of three main criteria: average lifespan, access to knowledge, and gross national income adjusted for purchasing power parity. Scores range from 0 to 1, 1 being the highest level of development, 0 being the lowest level.

Part 5: Results

*Hypothesis 1: Chinese investment should be positively related to favorability.*

A simple regression of China’s total favorability and China’s outward foreign investment showed non-significant results (Table 1). This is not surprising since foreign investment is better received in some countries than in others. More so, some countries may have a domestic

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environment that is hostile to a strong international presence, in which case FDI would have a negative impact on favorability.

**Table 1: Statistical Findings Relating to Hypothesis 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>98.42192**</td>
<td>7.014775</td>
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<tr>
<td>China OFDI Stock</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHD Index</td>
<td>-63.69541**</td>
<td>10.12767</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Degrees of Freedom = 50, R-squared = 0.4537, ** Significant at p<0.01

**Hypothesis 2:** *China’s investment should be positively related to favorability when import levels are controlled for.*

To create a more complex model, I added data on imports to the equation (see Table 2). Both imports and China’s Stock OFDI are significant in this new regression, however both have little explanatory power compared to human development. An increase of one percentage point in imports to GDP leads to a .23 percentage point increase in total favorability towards China. OFDI does a little worse in explanatory power. A ten point increase in stock OFDI (an increase of ten million USD) leads to a .06 percentage point increase in favorability.

In a similar regression (Table 3), I classified countries in my sample into import substituting (ISI=1) and non-import substituting regimes (ISI=0). This accounted for a little more of the variance than the previous model with an R-squared value of .542. A one-unit increase in ISI, in other words the difference between a non-import substituting regime and an import substituting regime, leads to a 10 percentage point low in total favorability towards China.
Table 2: Statistical Findings Relating to Hypothesis 2 (Imports)

<table>
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<td>Imports</td>
<td>.2283579*</td>
<td>.0978041</td>
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</table>

Degrees of Freedom = 50, R-squared = 0.5105, * Significant at p<0.05, ** Significant at p<0.01

Table 3: Statistical Findings Relating to Hypothesis 2 (ISI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>UNHD Index</td>
<td>-68.84652**</td>
<td>9.530177</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>-10.07098**</td>
<td>3.352986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degrees of Freedom= 50, R-squared = 0.5417, * Significant at p<0.05, ** Significant at p<0.01

Because import substituting regimes benefit less from foreign investment and may have a domestic environment with less positive views towards foreign actors, non-import substituting regimes should exhibit a more positive relationship between OFDI and favorability. The data below (Table 4) demonstrates this trend, however the results are not statistically significant in terms of OFDI. Within import substituting countries (Table 5), a one million USD increase in foreign investment from China leads to less than a .006 percentage point increase in total favorability, however the same monetary investment increase in non-import substituting countries leads to a little over .01 percentage point increase. The model using only non-import substituting countries accounted for around 63% of the variance.
Table 4: Simple Regression with only Non-Import Substituting Countries

<table>
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<th>Independent Variables</th>
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<td>13.20816</td>
</tr>
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Degrees of Freedom = 25, R-squared = 0.6297, ** Significant at p<0.01

Table 5: Simple Regression with only Import Substituting Countries

<table>
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<th>Independent Variables</th>
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<td>UNHD Index</td>
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<td>14.23785</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degrees Freedom = 24, R-squared = 0.4283, ** Significant at p<0.01

**Hypothesis 3:** China’s investment should be positively related to favorability in countries with high levels of education.

Education has been proven to demonstrate an increased positive economic effect from foreign direct investment. The data however does not demonstrate any statistically significant effect from higher levels of education, and in fact, the regression (Table 6) did not produce the expected sign. Subsequent regressions including a control variable for imports or import-substituting regimes yielded similarly insignificant results.

Table 6: Statistical Findings Related to Hypothesis 3

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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-1.135281</td>
<td>.173288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degrees of Freedom = 47, R-squared = 0.6297, ** Significant at p<0.01
**Hypothesis 4:** China’s Investment should be positively related to favorability in liberal economic systems.

Liberal economic systems should have a similar effect on favorability as imports. Because people in liberal economic systems should tend to see value in foreign investment they should associate an increase in foreign investment with positive opinions towards a country. Without accounting for imports, the effect of economic liberalism on favorability is negative and insignificant (Table 7). Even when accounting for imports, the results are still incorrectly signed but significant. This is incorrect signage may indicate that liberal economic systems are associated with higher levels of human development, which has a much stronger negative association with China’s favorability.

**Table 7: Statistical Findings Relating to Hypothesis 4**

<table>
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</tbody>
</table>

Degrees of Freedom = 50, R-squared = 0.4598, ** Significant at p<0.01

**Improvements and Issues**

The data used in this experiment is collapsed into mean values. A more sophisticated approach could be to find other ways to account for missing data. Since Stock OFDI is an average over seven years, I did not lag the data, however there may be a time lag in the effects of investment on favorability. Further experiments may use a more sophisticated measurement of economic liberalism and trade regime classification. While the demonstrates a positive
relationship between investment and public opinion towards China, the causal arrow may be misdirected and instead signal that China invests in places where it has a positive national image.

Section II: Explaining Investment’s Persuasive Power through Field Experimentation in Vietnam

If my results are correct, regardless of country conditions, investment from China has a comparatively small impact on public opinion towards China. To explain this discrepancy between data and theory, I used individual-level survey data from two major Vietnamese cities: Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi. This data demonstrates that interest and knowledge on economic investment in Vietnam is low among the general population of these two cities, yet, when prompted with positive information on Chinese investment or negative information on territorial disputes, responses are more or less favorable respectively. This section is laid out in five parts. First, I explain why Vietnam is a strong location for this study. Second I posit one main hypothesis. Second, I discuss the survey methodology used. Third, I interpret the results of the data. Finally, I discuss the limits of this field experiment.

Part 1: Background on Location Choice

Because of China’s traditional power throughout East, Southeast, and Near East Asia, distrust towards their large neighbor has been a constant throughout countries within this region. Gilbert Rozman even goes so far as to call the resulting distorted regionalism “the ashes of a
century of memories of multiple sorrows\textsuperscript{30}. Politicians throughout the 20\textsuperscript{th} century used these strong sentiments within the country to solidify political power and mobilize the population, resulting in a structural pattern of aggression and pacifism\textsuperscript{31}.

Because of limited time and monetary constraints, I chose to focus on one specific Asian country to survey. While the results would be more valuable across countries and longitudinally, for practical purposes I surveyed only in one country over one summer. While the summer of 2013 was a hot-bed of activity in the South China Sea, the uniformity across Vietnam of knowledge about China’s perceived antagonizations should yield significant results were subjects to respond positively to questions towards China. Out of the countries in Asia, Vietnam should have strong negative feelings towards China, meaning any movement from negative to positive is more deliberate than in countries with less strong feelings. Finally, choosing a country with similar cultural values and a heavy reliance on foreign direct investment should yield strong results. Vietnam presents an interesting case in the cultural divide between North and South and more importantly in the different historical relationship with China.

China and Vietnam have a long history of conflict, cooperation, and shared cultural experiences. In 2001, Thompson identified Vietnam-China relations as a minor country enduring rivalry dyad; however that dynamic has changed with China's recent economic development. Despite historical security issues, as Vietnam’s largest trading partner, the relationship between China and Vietnam is important to Vietnam’s national interest. Trade between the two countries exceeded US $40 Billion in 2011 (almost a third of their GDP) and is expected to reach $60

Billion by 2015\textsuperscript{32}, yet economic issues persist with an ever widening trade deficit of $13 Billion for 2012 (one-third of US trade deficit with China\textsuperscript{33}), fueled by Chinese trade restrictions\textsuperscript{34}. Despite sharing religious and familial traditions, current territory disputes have intensified in recent years prompting similar public turmoil\textsuperscript{35}. Because of frequent interaction, shared cultures, and strained relations, Vietnam creates an ideal setting to understand China's economic soft power initiatives.

Vietnam experienced market-oriented economic reforms, or \textit{Doi Moi}, starting in 1986 and began moving towards trade liberalization. Since then, the government of Vietnam has encouraged growth in foreign direct investment as a method for economic growth in Vietnam. This liberalization resulted in rapid growth for the Vietnamese economy, bringing significant numbers of Vietnamese out of poverty. From 1988 to December of 2006, the total registered foreign investment capital amounted to over US$78 billion. In their research, Hoang, Wiboonchutikula, and Tubtimtong found a strong relationship between FDI and economic growth in Vietnam\textsuperscript{36}.

\textbf{Part 2: Hypothesis}

In analysis of my own survey taken over the summer of 2013, I propose subjects will respond differently to pro-China and anti-China treatments. The pro-China treatment, dealing

with Chinese investment in Vietnam will persuade subjects to report a more favorable opinion towards China, whereas the anti-China treatment will persuade subjects to report a less favorable opinion towards China.

**Hypothesis:**

*Subjects will respond differently to pro-China and anti-China treatments.*

*a. A treatment informing subjects of the benefits of Chinese investment in Vietnam will result in a more favorable view of China*

*b. A treatment informing subjects of the boundary dispute between China and Vietnam will result in a less favorable view of China*

**Part 3: Methodology**

The survey population of interest was Vietnamese opinions towards China, however due to resource constraints, I was only able to survey in two major cities in Vietnam- Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC/Saigon). Thirty-six percent of foreign direct investment from 1996 to 2006 was located in either Ho Chi Minh City or Ha Noi, and the next three provinces with the highest investment level border these two major cities. This means the survey population is highly exposed to FDI, most likely significantly more so than more rural areas in the country.

The survey was conducted for seven weeks between the months of June and July through street sampling. In Ho Chi Minh City each of the 12 municipal districts was divided into two survey districts totaling 24 survey districts, then two locations were selected in each survey district. These were usually busy streets, small restaurants, bookstores, coffee shops, or college

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Approximately twelve surveys were completed in each location for a total of 597. Because of separate constraints, I was unable to use the same method in Ha Noi. Using a network in Vietnam, I surveyed office workers, college students, movie-goers, blood-drive participants, and other general street populations for a total of 587 respondents.

The survey was laid out in four parts. First, I asked general knowledge questions such as “When you follow the news these days, how interested are you in news about the relations of Vietnam with other countries?” as well as a question asking respondents to identify the country of origin of four major brands. Second, I asked respondents their feelings in general towards three countries as well as companies originating from these countries: China, South Korea, and India. Fourth, I administered an experimental treatment. Third, I asked a range of individual questions including employment, education and age. A survey with translations can be found in Appendix 1.

For the treatment experiment, before the last two non-background questions, one-third of the respondents were given a prompt stating “There are many different facets to Vietnam’s relationship with China. For instance, China and Vietnam have argued about ownership of the Paracel Islands.” Another third of the respondents were given a prompt stating “There are many different facets to Vietnam's relationship with China. For instance, China has invested $4.3 Billion USD in Vietnam, creating many jobs.” A final third of the respondents were given a prompt stating “There are many different facets to Vietnam's relationship with China.” The following questions two questions then asked “On balance, would you say that China and Vietnam have a very good, somewhat good, not very good, or poor relationship?” and “Do you think that China protects Vietnam's interests or harms its interests? Would you say that it Protects/Harms Very much or somewhat?”
Treatment Groups:

“Pro-China” Treatment: “There are many different facets to Vietnam’s relationship with China. For instance, China has invested $4.3 Billion USD in Vietnam, creating many jobs.”

“Anti-China” Treatment: “There are many different facets to Vietnam’s relationship with China. For instance, China and Vietnam have argued about ownership of the Paracel Islands.”

Baseline or Control: “There are many different facets to Vietnam’s relationship with China.”

A preliminary distribution of the mean values of age, education, employment, and city location across the treatment groups revealed similar responses (Table 1). Prior to administration of the treatment there was no significant difference between the three treatment groups for all question responses except one question asking respondents to rate their attitude towards China in the form of a temperature scale. Both the “pro-China” and “anti-China” treatment groups had slightly lower average responses (21 and 23 respectively) to this question than the control group (26). The distribution of the temperature data across treatment groups is displayed in Table 2.
Table 1: Distribution of mean values of background indicators across treatment groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male (yes=1; no=0)</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Employment Level</th>
<th>Ho Chi Minh City (yes=1; no=0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-China</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-China</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Distribution of mean opinion values across treatment groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Interested in Foreign Relations</th>
<th>Temperature: China</th>
<th>Temperature: South Korea</th>
<th>Temperature: India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-China</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-China</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Part 4: Results

Result 1: Low knowledge of investment country-of-origin

When asked “When you follow the news these days, how interested are you in news about the relations of Vietnam with other countries?” the mean response was 1.68 with a standard deviation of 0.72. This value means the average respondent either is very interested or somewhat interested in Vietnam’s foreign relations. While respondents may have a high interest
in Vietnam’s relations, the average respondent knew very little about the country-of-origin for the four companies listed in the survey. Survey respondents were asked to identify the country of origin for four countries with five possible options (see Appendix 1 for question wording). Responses were rated either 1 for a correct answer or 0 for an incorrect answer. The number of observations, mean and standard error for each company is included in Table 3 below. Haier, originating from China, was the least well-known in the group.

Table 3: Country of Origin Knowledge Question Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company (origin)</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Casumina (Vietnam)</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>.559</td>
<td>.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foxconn (Taiwan)</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>.463</td>
<td>.499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haier (China)</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>.327</td>
<td>.470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samsung (Korea)</td>
<td>1027</td>
<td>.852</td>
<td>.355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Result 2: Effects of Treatment Experiment

Overall in the post-treatment questions, the “pro-China” treatment was related to more positive opinions towards China and the “anti-China” treatment was related to more negative opinions towards China. However, these results were only significant in responses to the first post-treatment question on Vietnam’s relationship with China, not the second question regarding Chinese protection of Vietnam’s interests. Interestingly, the “Anti-China” treatment was related to stronger negative views towards China than the “Pro-China” treatment’s positive relationship. Table 4 and Table 5 show the distribution of responses to the two post-treatment questions.
Table 4: Vietnam-China Relationship Crosstab

“On balance, would you say that China and Vietnam have a very good, somewhat good, not very good, or poor relationship?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anti-China Treatment</th>
<th>Pro-China Treatment</th>
<th>No Treatment</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Good</td>
<td>6 (1.66%)</td>
<td>10 (2.76%)</td>
<td>8 (2.22%)</td>
<td>24 (2.21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Good</td>
<td>95 (26.54%)</td>
<td>148 (40.88%)</td>
<td>121 (33.61%)</td>
<td>364 (33.58%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Good</td>
<td>134 (37.02%)</td>
<td>132 (36.46%)</td>
<td>135 (37.50%)</td>
<td>401 (36.99%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>127 (35.08%)</td>
<td>72 (19.89%)</td>
<td>95 (26.39%)</td>
<td>294 (27.12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>1,084</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*One respondent in the control group added in a response between 2 and 3. This response is calculated in the total but not shown in the graph

Table 5: Vietnam China Protection Crosstab

“Do you think that China protects Vietnam's interests or harms its interests? Would you say that it Protects/Harms Very much or somewhat?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anti-China Treatment</th>
<th>Pro-China Treatment</th>
<th>No Treatment</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Much Protects</td>
<td>2 (.56%)</td>
<td>1 (.28%)</td>
<td>3 (.83%)</td>
<td>6 (.56%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat protects</td>
<td>39 (10.99%)</td>
<td>56 (15.64%)</td>
<td>36 (9.97%)</td>
<td>131 (12.20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat harms</td>
<td>137 (38.59%)</td>
<td>141 (39.39%)</td>
<td>156 (43.21%)</td>
<td>434 (40.41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very much harms</td>
<td>177 (49.86%)</td>
<td>159 (44.41%)</td>
<td>165 (45.71%)</td>
<td>500 (46.55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>358ii</td>
<td>361iii</td>
<td>1,074</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*iiOne respondent in the “pro-China” treatment group added in a response between 2 and 3. This response is calculated in the total but not shown in the graph

*iiiOne respondent in the “pro-China” treatment group added in a response between 2 and 3. This response is calculated in the total but not shown in the graph
Regarding the first question on Vietnam’s relationship with China, approximately 44% of the “Pro-China” treatment group or 158 respondents rated the relationship positively (either very good or somewhat good). Only 36% of the baseline group and 28% of the “Anti-China” treatment group rated the relationship positively. Conversely, about 73% of the “Anti-China” treatment group rated the relationship poorly (not very good or poor), compared to 56% of the “Pro-China” treatment group and 64% of the baseline group. A Chi-squared test revealed a probability value of 0.000 indicating that these results are statistically significant. A simple regression of the relationship between Vietnam and China with “pro-China,” “anti-China,” and a propensity towards China (taken as a combination of the survey questions on favorability towards China and Chinese companies) yielded the regression results included in table 3. Both treatment groups are correctly signed with a modest, but highly significant impact on evaluations of the relationship between Vietnam and China.

Regarding the second question on China’s protection of Vietnam’s interests, the results are less striking. Around 16%, or 57, of the “Pro-China” treatment respondents considered China to protect or somewhat protect Vietnam’s interests. Around 11% of the baseline and 12% of the “anti-China” treatment thought China protected Vietnam’s interests. Of those who responded “Harms Very much” 33.6% (314/934) were in the “anti-China” treatment group, while 32.1% and 34.4% were in the “pro-China” and baseline treatment groups respectively. A chi-squared test resulted in a probability value of 0.255, indicating that these results are not statistically significant.

A simple regression of the relationship between Vietnam and China with “pro-China,” “anti-China,” and a propensity towards China (taken as a combination of the survey questions on favorability towards China and Chinese companies) yielded the regression results included in
Table 6. Both treatment groups are correctly signed with a modest, but significant impact on evaluations of the relationship between Vietnam and China. The “Anti-China” treatment elicited a stronger negative response than the same regression using data on evaluations of China’s protection of Vietnam’s interests (Table 7) indicated that while the effects of the treatment groups were correctly signed, again the results were not significant.

Table 6: Regression Analysis of Evaluations of Vietnam’s Relationship with China and Treatment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>1.4758**</td>
<td>.0559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-China</td>
<td>-.1220*</td>
<td>.0556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-China</td>
<td>0.1680**</td>
<td>.0312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propensity towards China</td>
<td>0.4721**</td>
<td>.1008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degrees of Freedom = 1067, ** Significant at p<0.01

Table 7: Regression Analysis of Evaluations of China’s protection of Vietnamese Interests and Treatment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>2.1039**</td>
<td>.0869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-China</td>
<td>-.0373</td>
<td>.0480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-China</td>
<td>.0376</td>
<td>.0480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propensity towards China</td>
<td>0.4166**</td>
<td>.0269</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degrees of Freedom = 1059, ** Significant at p<0.01

Part 5: Issues with Methodology

The data used was not from a nationally-representative sample, so these results may not be used to describe all of Vietnam. Importantly, this data does not include responses from poorer, less trade-dependent, rural areas of Vietnam, only two major internationally-minded cities. Most of the economic political decisions are made in these two centers, making public opinion in these centers the most salient. As discussed above, Ho Chi Minh City, Ha Noi, and their neighbors
account most of the FDI in the country. More so, since the survey was administered as a packet, respondents were able to read through the entire survey before answering the questions, meaning some of the earlier responses may have been also subject to treatment. Also, many of the respondents took the survey in a social setting, thus increasing susceptibility to social desirability bias. Because of Vietnam’s tense relationship with China, the results may be indicative only of Vietnam and not of a larger Asian or even international community. Finally, I am hesitant to consider the effect of the treatment to have long-term implications on the subject’s opinion towards China. The subject may simply have felt encouraged to report a more favorable opinion so as to not disappoint the foreign surveyor, or the subject may have forgotten the treatment by even the very next question, which would explain the less strong effects of treatment on the second question.

Conclusion

The data and experiment discussed in this paper shows that national-level favorability is in part determined by foreign investment and a malleable concept, at least in the short-term. China’s investment in foreign countries does exhibit a positive relationship, however more research needs to be done to confirm causality. The results from my field experiment in Vietnam indicate that national image is susceptible to prompting and that increased information on the benefits of Chinese investment in Vietnam does positively influence perceptions of Vietnam’s relationship with China.

These results build upon the Page and Xie’s previous work on the subject of national determinants of China’s public opinion. The increase in data and refinement of country conditions resulted in conflicting results. Page and Xie did not find investment to be statistically
significant, however, this data suggests that there may have been a lag in public opinion from investment, causing four years of additional data to yield statistically significant results.

My results indicate that China may have a costly and complicated road ahead of them in improving its national image. The results of this paper suggest two options: increase investment, and publicize investment. A 1 billion USD increase in investment only yielded a 6 percentage point increase in favorability towards China, which creates a very costly prospect for using money to increase public opinion. A cheaper, but more complicated way, may be to publicize China’s investment in foreign countries. This, however, would need to be done delicately to avoid backlash in nationalistic countries. The soft power yielded by foreign investment is significant, but difficult to harness in concrete policy decisions. In a country with massive wealth discrepancy and immense poverty, whether this soft power is worth the effort to implement is up to the Chinese government to decide.
Appendix 1: Vietnam Field Survey with Translation

This survey is for undergraduate-level research at the University of Notre Dame. You were selected randomly to participate in this survey and your participation is entirely voluntary. The survey should take about three minutes to complete and is completely anonymous. Should you choose to participate, you may leave any questions blank or terminate the survey at any point. Should you wish to participate please answer the following questions, in order, to the best of your ability.


1. When you follow the news these days, how interested are you in news about the relations of Vietnam with other countries?
   Khi bạn theo dõi tin tức những ngày này, bạn quan tâm đến các tin tức về mối quan hệ của Việt Nam với các nước khác đến mức nào?
   1. Very interested – Rất quan tâm
   2. Somewhat interested – Hơi quan tâm
   3. Hardly interested – Hầu như không quan tâm
   4. Don’t follow the news – Không theo dõi tin tức

2. Please rate your feelings toward the following, with one hundred meaning a very warm, favorable feeling, zero meaning a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and fifty meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from zero to one hundred, the higher the number the more favorable your feelings are toward that place.
   Vui lòng ước lượng cảm nghĩ của bạn về các nước sau, với 100 tương ứng với cảm nghĩ tích cực, 0 tương ứng với cảm nghĩ tiêu cực, bất trừ, và 50 tương ứng với thái độ trung lập. Bạn có thể sử dụng bất kỳ số nào từ 0 đến 100, số càng cao tức có nghĩ bạn càng có thiện cảm về nước bạn đang đánh giá.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C. CHINA – TRUNG QUỐC</th>
<th>INSERT RATING FROM ZERO TO ONE HUNDRED IN THIS COLUMN GHI NHẬN SỐ ĐIỂM TỪ 0 ĐẾN 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
3. Please tell me if you think, on balance, companies from the following countries make a positive or negative contribution in Vietnam.
Xin vui lòng cho tôi biết nếu bạn nghĩ rằng, trên sự cân bằng, các công ty từ các quốc gia đóng góp tích cực hay tiêu cực ở Việt Nam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Very positive – Rất tích cực</th>
<th>Somewhat positive – Khá tích cực</th>
<th>Somewhat negative – Khá tiêu cực</th>
<th>Very negative – Rất tiêu cực</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China – Trung Quốc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea – Hàn Quốc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India – Ấn Độ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. To the best of your knowledge, the companies listed below originated in which country? Please mark with an “x”
Với sự hiểu biết của bạn, các công ty được liệt kê dưới đây có nguồn gốc từ quốc gia nào? Vui lòng đánh dấu với một "X"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>China- Trung Quốc</th>
<th>South Korea- Hàn Quốc</th>
<th>Japan- Nhật Bản</th>
<th>Taiwan- Đài Loan</th>
<th>Vietnam- Việt Nam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Casumina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foxconn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haier</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samsung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Please describe Petrovietnam’s economic impact on yourself, your community, and Vietnam.
6. Please describe China’s economic impact on yourself, your community, and Vietnam.
Vui lòng mô tả tác động của kinh tế Trung Quốc đối với bạn, cộng đồng nơi bạn đang sống nơi riêng, và Việt Nam nói chung.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very positive — Rất tích cực</th>
<th>Somewhat positive — Khá tích cực</th>
<th>Somewhat negative — Khá tiêu cực</th>
<th>Very negative — Rất tiêu cực</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yourself as an individual-chính mình</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your community-công động của bạn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam- Việt Nam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Please describe South Korea’s economic impact on yourself, your community, and Vietnam.
Vui lòng mô tả tác động của kinh tế Hàn Quốc đối với bạn, cộng đồng nơi bạn đang sống nơi riêng, và Việt Nam nói chung.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very positive — Rất tích cực</th>
<th>Somewhat positive — Khá tích cực</th>
<th>Somewhat negative — Khá tiêu cực</th>
<th>Very negative — Rất tiêu cực</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yourself as an individual-chính mình</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Please describe India’s economic impact on yourself, your community, and Vietnam.
Vui lòng mô tả tác động của kinh tế Ấn Độ đối với bạn, cộng đồng nơi bạn đang sống nói riêng, và Việt Nam nói chung.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Very positive – Rất tích cực</th>
<th>Somewhat positive – Khá tích cực</th>
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<th>Very negative – Rất tiêu cực</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yourself as an individual-chính mình</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your community-đồng của bạn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam- Việt Nam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. There are many different facets to Vietnam's relationship with China. [BLOCK]
Có nhiều khía cạnh khác nhau trong mối quan hệ của Việt Nam với Trung Quốc.

On balance, would you say that China and Vietnam have a very good, somewhat good, not very good, or poor relationship?
Trên sự cân bằng, bạn sẽ nói rằng Trung Quốc và Việt Nam có mối quan hệ rất tốt, phần nào tốt, không phải là rất tốt, hay rất tệ?
   a. Very good- rất tốt
   b. Somewhat good- phần nào tốt
   c. Not very good- không phải là rất tốt
   d. Poor- Tệ

Do you think that China protects Vietnam's interests or harms its interests? Would you say that it Protects/Harms Very much or somewhat?
Bạn có nghĩ rằng Trung Quốc bảo vệ lợi ích của Việt Nam hoặc gây tổn hại lợi ích của Việt Nam? Bạn sẽ nói rằng nó Bảo vệ / Harms Rất nhiều hoặc phân nào?
   a. Very much protects - bảo vệ rất nhiều
   b. Somewhat protects- bảo vệ phần nào
   c. Somewhat harms – tổn hại phần nào
   d. Very much harms – tổn hại rất nhiều

Block #1: For instance, China and Vietnam have argued about ownership of the Paracel Islands.
#1: Ví dụ, Trung Quốc và Việt Nam đã lập luận về quyền sở hữu quần đảo Hoàng Sa.

Block #2: For instance, China has invested $4.3 Billion USD in Vietnam, creating many jobs.

#2: Ví dụ, Trung Quốc đã đầu tư hơn $ 4,3 tỷ USD tại Việt Nam, tạo ra nhiều công ăn việc làm.

Block #3: [Blank]

**Background Information - Thông tin nền**

1. Please tell me your age. _____
   Xin vui lòng cho biết tuổi của bạn. _____

2. Please tell me what is the highest class in school you have completed.
   Xin vui lòng cho biết trình độ học vấn cao nhất của anh/ chị.
   
   - Primary, basic, elementary school or less (6 years of formal education or less) – Tiểu học (6 năm học chính thức)
   - Some high school, preparatory school, secondary school or equivalent (less than 12 years of formal education or equivalent) – Trung học cơ sở hoặc trung trường đương (dưới 12 năm học chính thức)
   - Completed secondary education. This includes high school diploma; secondary, technical or preparatory school certificate; or equivalent – Tốt nghiệp trung học phổ thông
   - Some college; Intermediate or Associates Degree (less than university degree Bachelors degree or higher) – Trung cấp, Cao đẳng hoặc văn bằng tương đương (thấp hơn bằng cử nhân)
   - A Bachelors degree, Doctorate, other advanced degree, or equivalent – Bằng cử nhân, tiến sĩ hoặc các văn bằng tương đương

3. Employment - Tình trạng việc làm:
   a. Unemployed- Thất nghiệp
   b. Student- sinh viên
   c. Primary Wage Earner- người có thu nhập tiền lương chính (If so, what industry?- Nếu như vậy, ngành công nghiệp gì?______________________________)
   d. Supplemental wage earner- người có thu nhập tiền lương bổ sung (If so, what industry? - Nếu như vậy, những gì ngành công nghiệp?______________________________)

4. Is anyone in your immediate family “Chinese”? - Có bất cứ ai trong gia đình của bạn là “Trung Quốc” không?
   a. No
   b. Yes
5. Is anyone in your immediate family “Indian”? - Có bất cứ ai trong gia đình của bạn là "Ấn Độ" không?
   a. No
   b. Yes

6. Is anyone in your immediate family “Korean”? – Có bất cứ ai trong gia đình của bạn là "Hàn Quốc" không?
   a. No
   b. Yes

7. How long have you lived in this community? - Bạn sống trong cộng đồng này được bao lâu rồi?___________
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